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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 94-431
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JAMES D. RYDER, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the armed forces
[June 12, 1995]

  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
  Petitioner, an enlisted member of the United States
Coast Guard, challenges his conviction by a court-
martial.  His conviction was affirmed first by the Coast
Guard Court of Military Review, and then by the United
States Court of Military Appeals.  The latter court
agreed with petitioner that the two civilian judges who
served on the Court of Military Review had not been
appointed in accordance with the dictates of the Appoint-
ments Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, 2, cl. 2, but
nonetheless held that the actions of those judges were
valid de facto.  We hold that the judges' actions were
not valid de facto.
  Petitioner was convicted of several drug offenses, and
was sentenced by a general court-martial to five years'
confinement (later reduced to three years), forfeiture in
pay, reduction in grade, and a dishonorable discharge.
He appealed to the Coast Guard Court of Military
Review, which, except in one minor aspect, affirmed his
conviction.  34 M. J. 1077 (1992).  On request for
rehearing, petitioner challenged the composition of that
court as violative of the Appointments Clause of the
Constitution because two of the judges on the three-
judge panel were civilians appointed by the General
Counsel of the Department of Transportation.  The court
granted rehearing and rejected this challenge.  34 M. J.
1259 (1992).
  The Court of Military Appeals likewise affirmed
petitioner's conviction, 39 M. J. 454 (1994), although it
agreed with petitioner that the appellate judges on the
Coast Guard Court of Military Review had been appointed
in violation of the Appointments Clause.  The court
relied for this conclusion on its previous decision in
United States v. Carpenter, 37 M. J. 291 (1993), where
it had decided that appellate military judges are inferior
officers whose service requires appointment by a Presi-
dent, a court of law, or a head of a department.  U. S.
Const., Art. II,  2, cl. 2.  Despite finding a constitu-
tional violation in the appointment of two judges on
petitioner's three-judge appellate panel, the Court of
Military Appeals affirmed his conviction on the ground
that the actions of these judges were valid de facto,
citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
We granted certiorari.  513 U. S. - (1995).
  The de facto officer doctrine confers validity upon acts
performed by a person acting under the color of official
title even though it is later discovered that the legality
of that person's appointment or election to office is
deficient.  Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 440
(1886).  -The de facto doctrine springs from the fear of
the chaos that would result from multiple and repeti-
tious suits challenging every action taken by every
official whose claim to office could be open to question,
and seeks to protect the public by insuring the orderly
functioning of the government despite technical defects
in title to office.-  63A Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and
Employees  578, pp. 1080-1081 (1984) (footnote omit-
ted).  The doctrine has been relied upon by this Court
in several cases involving challenges by criminal defend-
ants to the authority of a judge who participated in
some part of the proceedings leading to their conviction
and sentence.
  In Ball v. United States, 140 U. S. 118 (1891), a
Circuit Judge assigned a District Judge from the
Western District of Louisiana to sit in the Eastern
District of Texas as a replacement for the resident judge
who had fallen ill and who later died.  The assigned
judge continued to sit until the successor to the deceased
judge was duly appointed.  The assigned judge had
sentenced Ball after the resident judge had died, and
Ball made no objection at that time.  Ball later moved
in arrest of judgment challenging the sentence imposed
upon him by the assigned judge after the death of the
resident judge, but this Court held that the assigned
judge -was judge de facto if not de jure, and his acts as
such are not open to collateral attack.-  Id., at 128-129.
  Similarly, in McDowell v. United States, 159 U. S. 596
(1895), a Circuit Judge assigned a Judge from the
Eastern District of North Carolina to sit as a District
Judge in the District of South Carolina until a vacancy
in the latter district was filled.  McDowell was indicted
and convicted during the term in which the assigned
judge served, but made no objection at the time of his
indictment or trial.  He later challenged the validity of
his conviction because of a claimed error in the assigned
judge's designation.  This Court decided that the
assigned judge was a -judge de facto,- and that -his
actions as such, so far as they affect third persons, are
not open to question.-  Id., at 601.  The Court further
observed that McDowell's claim -presents a mere matter
of statutory construction . . . .  It involves no trespass
upon the executive power of appointment.-  Id., at 598.
In a later case, Ex parte Ward, 173 U. S. 452 (1899),
petitioner sought an original writ of habeas corpus to
challenge the authority of the District Judge who had
sentenced him on the grounds that the appointment of
the judge during a Senate recess was improper.  This
Court held that -the title of a person acting with color
of authority, even if he be not a good officer in point of
law, cannot be collaterally attacked.-  Id., at 456.
  In the case before us, petitioner challenged the
composition of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review
while his case was pending before that court on direct
review.  Unlike the defendants in Ball, McDowell, and
Ward, petitioner raised his objection to the judges' titles
before those very judges and prior to their action on his
case.  And his claim is based on the Appointments
Clause of Article II of the Constitution-a claim that
there has been a -trespass upon the executive power of
appointment,-  McDowell, supra, at 598, rather than a
misapplication of a statute providing for the assignment
of already appointed judges to serve in other districts.
  In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 125, we said -[t]he
Appointments Clause could, of course, be read as merely
dealing with etiquette or protocol in describing 'Officers
of the United States' but the drafters had a less frivo-
lous purpose in mind.-  The Clause is a bulwark against
one branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of
another branch, but it is more: it -preserves another
aspect of the Constitution's structural integrity by
preventing the diffusion of the appointment power.-
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 878 (1991).  In
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530 (1962), we
declined to invoke the de facto officer doctrine in order
to avoid deciding a question arising under Article III of
the Constitution, saying that the cases in which we had
relied on that doctrine did not involve -basic constitu-
tional protections designed in part for the benefit of
litigants.-  Id., at 536 (plurality).  We think that one
who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional
validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates
his case is entitled to a decision on the merits of the
question and whatever relief may be appropriate if a
violation indeed occurred.  Any other rule would create
a disincentive to raise Appointments Clause challenges
with respect to questionable judicial appointments.
  The Court of Military Appeals relied, not without
reason, on our decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1
(1976).  There, plaintiffs challenged the appointment of
the Federal Election Commission members on separation
of powers grounds.  The Court agreed with them and
held that the appointment of four members of the
Commission by Congress, rather than the President,
violated the Appointments Clause.  It nonetheless quite
summarily held that the -past acts of the Commission
are therefore accorded de facto validity.-  Id., at 142.
We cited as authority for this determination Connor v.
Williams, 404 U. S. 549, 550-551 (1972), in which we
held that legislative acts performed by legislators held
to have been elected in accordance with an unconstitu-
tional apportionment were not therefore void.
  Neither Buckley nor Connor explicitly relied on the de
facto officer doctrine, though the result reached in each
case validated the past acts of public officials.  But in
Buckley, the constitutional challenge raised by the
plaintiffs was decided in their favor, and the declaratory
and injunctive relief they sought was awarded to them.
And Connor, like other voting rights cases, see Allen v.
State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 572 (1969);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969) (per
curiam), did not involve a defect in a specific officer's
title, but rather a challenge to the composition of an
entire legislative body.  The Court assumed, arguendo,
that an equal protection violation infected the District
Court's reapportionment plan, declined to invalidate the
elections that had already occurred, and reserved
judgment on the propriety of the prospective relief
requested by petitioners pending completion of further
District Court proceedings that could rectify any consti-
tutional violation present in the court-ordered redistrict-
ing plan.  Connor, supra, at 550-551.  To the extent
these civil cases may be thought to have implicitly
applied a form of the de facto officer doctrine, we are
not inclined to extend them beyond their facts.
  The Government alternatively defends the decision of
the Court of Military Appeals on the grounds that it
was, for several reasons, proper for that court to give its
decision in Carpenter-holding that the appointment of
the civilian judges to the Coast Guard Court of Military
Appeals violated the Appointments Clause-prospective
application only.  It first argues that the Court of
Military Appeals exercised remedial discretion pursuant
to Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971).  But
whatever the continuing validity of Chevron Oil after
Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. -
(1993), and Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U. S.
- (1995), there is not the sort of grave disruption or
inequity involved in awarding retrospective relief to this
petitioner that would bring that doctrine into play.  The
parties agree that the defective appointments of the
civilian judges affect only between 7 to 10 cases pending
on direct review.  As for the Government's concern that
a flood of habeas corpus petitions will ensue, precedent
provides little basis for such fears.  Ex parte Ward, 173
U. S. 452 (1899).
  Nor does the Government persuade us that the inquiry
into clearly established law as it pertains to qualified
immunity counsels in favor of discretion to deny a
remedy in this case.  Qualified immunity specially
protects public officials from the specter of damages
liability for judgment calls made in a legally uncertain
environment.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 806
(1982) (-[O]ur decisions consistently have held that
government officials are entitled to some form of
immunity from suits for damages- (emphasis added)).
Providing relief to a claimant raising an Appointments
Clause challenge does not subject public officials to
personal damages that represent a -potentially disabling
threa[t] of liability,- but only invalidates actions taken
pursuant to defective title.  The qualified immunity
doctrine need not be extended to protect public officials
from such attacks.
  Similarly, the practice of denying criminal defendants
an exclusionary remedy from Fourth Amendment
violations when those errors occur despite the good faith
of the Government actors, United States v. Leon, 468
U. S. 897 (1984), does not require the affirmance of
petitioner's conviction in this case.  Finding the deter-
rent remedy of suppression not compelled by the Fourth
Amendment, id., at 910, that case specifically relied on
the -objectionable collateral consequence of [the] interfer-
ence with the criminal justice system's truth-finding
function- in requiring a blanket exclusionary remedy for
all violations, id., at 907, and the relative inffectiveness
of such remedy to deter future Fourth Amendment
violations in particular cases.  Id., at 918-921.  No
similar collateral consequence arises from rectifying an
Appointments Clause violation, and correcting Appoint-
ments Clause violations in cases such as this one
provides a suitable incentive to make such challenges.
  The Government finally suggests that the Court of
Military Appeals applied something akin to a harmless-
error doctrine in affirming petitioner's conviction,
refusing to redress the violation because petitioner
suffered no adverse consequences from the composition
of the Court.  Brief for United States 33.  The Govern-
ment did not argue below that the error, assuming it
occurred, was harmless, and there is no indication from
the Court of Military Appeals' summary disposition of
this issue that it determined that no harm occurred in
this case.  We therefore need not address whether the
alleged defects in the composition of petitioner's
appellate panel are susceptible to harmless error review.
The Government also argues, at least obliquely, that
whatever defect there may have been in the proceedings
before the Coast Guard Court of Military Review was in
effect cured by the review available to petitioner in the
Court of Military Appeals.  Brief for United States 24,
n. 16.  Again, because of the hierarchical nature of
sentence review in the system of military courts, we
need not address whether this defect is susceptible to
the cure envisioned by the Government.
  Congress has established three tiers of military courts
pursuant to its power -[t]o make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.-  U.
S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 14.  Cases such as the present
one are tried before a general court-martial consisting of
a military judge and not less than five service members
or by a military judge alone.  Art. 16(1), UCMJ, 10 U.
S. C. 816(1).  Four Courts of Military Review (one each
for the Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Navy-Marine
Corps) hear appeals from courts-martial in cases where
the approved sentence involves death, dismissal of a
commissioned officer, punitive discharge, or confinement
of one year or more.  Art. 66, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C.
866(b)(1).  These courts, which sit in panels of three or
more, exercise de novo review over the factual findings
and legal conclusions of the court-martial.  Art. 66(c),
UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. 866(c).
  The court of last resort in the military justice system
is the Court of Military Appeals.  Five civilian judges
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate
comprise the court.  Art. 142, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. 942
(1988 ed., Supp V).  The court grants review in cases
decided by the Courts of Military Review -upon petition
of the accused and on good cause shown.-  Art. 67,
UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. 867(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V).  The
scope of review is narrower than the review exercised by
the Court of Military Review; so long as there is some
competent evidence in the record to establish the
elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Court of Military Appeals will not reevaluate the facts.
United States v. Wilson, 6 M. J. 214 (1979).
  Examining the difference in function and authority
between the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, and
the Court of Military Appeals, it is quite clear that the
former had broader discretion to review claims of error,
revise factual determinations, and revise sentences than
did the latter.  It simply cannot be said, therefore, that
review by the properly constituted Court of Military
Appeals gave petitioner all the possibility for relief that
review by a properly constituted Coast Guard Court of
Military Appeals would have given him.  We therefore
hold that the Court of Military Appeals erred in accord-
ing de facto validity to the actions of the civilian judges
of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review.  Petitioner
is entitled to a hearing before a properly appointed
panel of that court.  The judgment is reversed, and the
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.